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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper elaborates on the concept of hybridity as deployed by The Asia Foundation (TAF)in their 
conflict management interventions in the province of Lanao del Sur, the Philippines. This analysis 
starts from a critical reading of one specific Theory of Change (ToC) that has been formulated by The 
Asia Foundation under the UK Department for International Development Programme Partnership 
Arrangements (DfID PPA) Component 5 and is entitled: ‘Community-level efforts to improve local 
security in Mindanao’. Two broad research questions have been derived from this ToC. First, an 
empirical analysis of the ‘weak state and strong traditional authority’ hypothesis that underpins the 
formulation of this ToC and conflict management strategy. Second, the question of whether the 
institutions through which TAF is working can be understood as hybrid institutions, in the sense that 
they reflect an interaction of the formal and the informal. The paper is then concluded by relating 
these major empirical findings to the broader Hybrid Political Order (HPO) literature. The main 
arguments from this paper can be divided into two major parts. A first, empirical part and a second 
part which deals more explicitly with the ToC and the place of hybridity therein.   
MAJOR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
• Our fieldwork data do not support the framing of Lanao del Sur as a province marked by weak 
state institutions and strong traditional institutions. Rather, traditional authority solely obtains 
relevance when this is combined with the coercive and financial resources associated with formal 
statehood. This observation also indicates how a traditional/informal institutional field cannot be 
separated from a formal institutional field but that these two entities overlap.  
 
• When trying to understand the intricacies and complexities of conflict management in Lanao del 
Sur, the main distinction that was being made by people was the one between formal punitive 
justice and amicable settlement. The importance here is that this practice of amicable settlement 
or mediation is not confined to an informal or traditional institutional sphere but is also performed 
within formal state institutions. It is therefore crucial to make a conceptual distinction between 
practices of conflict management and the specific institutional fora wherein these are being 
deployed. Following these observations, hybridity in this specific context should be understood as 
an interaction wherein formal governance institutions serve as venues in which informal practices 
of conflict mediation are being deployed. 
 
• The local executive maintains a firm grip on these initiatives of amicable settlement because of 
his/her access to coercive and financial resources associated with formal statehood and his/her 
direct control over the formal institutions wherein this amicable settlement is being practiced. 
Traditional authorities without a connection to the local executive only play a secondary role at 
best. 
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POLICY-ORIENTED FINDINGS 
Although never explicitly stated as such, it is clear that some of the general rationales behind this ToC 
share similarities with some basic features of the academic HPO literature. This is above all the case 
for the space that is provided to local usages, institutions and actors in settling conflict and initiating 
peace and the critical stance towards those types of interventions that uniquely focus on the creation, 
or engineering, of formal state institutions in bringing peace and stability. Despite these broad 
similarities, there are also some points of critique/improvement that can be mentioned.  
• There is no clearly defined added value to the usage of the concept of hybridity as an interaction 
between formal and informal institutional fields. Rather, the focus lies much more in the 
importance of including locally embedded indigenous practices of dispute settlement in a strategy 
of conflict management. The main advantage of this is: 1) a sense of ownership among the target 
population and, 2) a great deal of flexibility in mediating a local feud. These two issues were 
persistently mentioned as a substantial added value in the way in which TAF is intervening in the 
region. The issue of hybridity can be considered as secondary when compared to these two points.   
 
• The approach used by TAF is more of an actor-oriented approach rather than a truly institutional 
approach. The prime focus lies in building up a coalition (consisting of people from the formal 
and the informal institutional sphere) that can put pressure on warring parties to refrain from 
further using violence. The manner through which this happens is then based on a range of 
informal strategies of amicable settlement. In this sense, the rationale underlying these conflict 
management interventions comes remarkably close to what is being called a ‘coalitional ToC’ in 
other programmes.  
 
• It has been suggested that a potential avenue to rethink the added value of working through hybrid 
institutions is reconceptualising the balance between pragmatic conflict management interventions 
focusing on the quick settlement of violent disputes on the one hand, and governance programs 
aimed at the long-term reinforcement of impersonal institutions on the other hand. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE TAF THEORY OF CHANGE ON HYBRID 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
The theory of change that will be systematically analysed in this paper is formulated under the DFID 
PPA Component 5 and is entitled: ‘Community-level efforts to improve local security in Mindanao’.1 
This ToC states that: 
“By supporting hybrid or mixed systems that combine formal and informal approaches 
to managing conflicts, we allow the different systems to draw strength from one another, 
strengthen the conflict resolution process, reduce violence, and eventually draw the 
informal working systems into the ambit of mainstream formal governance structures.”2 
This ToC was formulated for the first time in 2011 and was introduced to partner organisations 
throughout 2012. The core ideas for this specific ToC are founded on a USAID sponsored research 
project on the root causes of violent conflict in Muslim Mindanao. The main argument of this study is 
that the majority of violent incidents in Mindanao are caused by different sorts of local disputes, or 
so-called rido (feuds).3 Secondly, it was argued that these feuds mainly played out between kinship 
groups, more specific clans/families. As such, the research by TAF questioned the commonly 
accepted framing of conflict in Mindanao as one being uniquely between Muslim armed groups 
versus the Philippine state. Based on these observations, a conflict management strategy has been 
developed by TAF that targets the quick settlement of local-level conflicts which play out between 
these kinship groups in Central and Western Mindanao. These programs have been implemented, 
simultaneously with the active involvement of TAF in the ongoing national-level peace talks between 
the MILF and the Philippine government. As such, a sort of dual strategy has been developed wherein 
programs of conflict management at the micro-level of society have been combined with national-
level peace talks.4 Since 2014 however, these local-level conflict management strategies have been 
put on a hold,5 in order to focus time and resources on the successful conclusion of the talks between 
the MILF and the government, and the installment of a new Bangsamoro, as a replacement for the 
current ARMM (Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao).      
While different arguments have been made about this specific ToC in previous TAF/JSRP papers, our 
aim with this third paper is to delve deeper into the concept of hybridity which is pivotal in the ToC 
formulated by TAF but which also has a central place in the research agenda of the JSRP. This will be 
done through a careful empirical analysis about the way TAF has been working with a specific set of 
conflict management institutions in the province of Lanao del Sur over the past years. In a later stage, 
this analysis will be then be broadened to wider and ongoing academic and policy discussions about 
                                                          
1
 For an analysis of the effectiveness of this ToC in the context of North Cotabato, see: Adam, Jeroen; 
Verbrugge, Boris and Vanden Boer, Dorien (2014a), Hybrid Systems of Conflict Management and Community-
Level Efforts to Improve Local Security in Mindanao, London: TAF/JSRP Paper 13 (Justice and Security 
Research Programme/ London School of Economics) 
2
 TAF Philippines (2012) PPA Year 1 Annual Component Report. Component 5 : Community-level Efforts to 
Improve Local Security in Mindanao. Unpublished document 
3
 The findings of this USAID research project are published in: Torres, Wilfredo Magno (2007a). Rido: Clan 
Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao. Makati City: The Asia Foundation. 
4
 For an analysis on the potential interaction between these two scales of programming, see: Adam, Jeroen; 
Verbrugge, Boris and Vanden Boer, Dorien (2014b) Peace Making and State-Society Interactions in Conflict-
torn Mindanao, London: TAF/JSRP Paper 18 (Justice and Security Research Programme/London School of 
Economics) 
5
 The exception is if the particular conflict threatens progress in the peace talks, as assessed by stakeholders in 
the region. 
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the place of hybrid institutions in peace building and conflict management. However, before we can 
touch upon these debates, it is necessary to analyse how hybridity is being conceptualised by TAF in 
their conflict management strategy. Based on a critical reading of TAF policy documents and 
interviews with TAF staff - in particular people from the Conflict Management Unit - two different 
levels can be distinguished wherein this concept of hybridity is being deployed.   
1. The institutions that are being applied by TAF in their strategy of conflict management are 
understood as hybrid institutions/systems. Within the actual ToC, these systems are being 
defined as: ‘hybrid or mixed systems that combine formal and informal approaches at 
managing conflicts.’6 Somewhat further in the PPA document, it is explained that these mixed 
or hybrid systems ‘combine the formal government framework with the informal 
indigenous/traditional approaches to managing conflict’. Although hybridity is clearly defined 
within this PPA as an interaction between formal and informal institutions, in daily parlance 
among TAF staff, this was much less the case. Here, the concept of hybridity is most often 
used to designate everything ‘informal’ which falls outside the strict, formal governance 
sphere. This can range from traditional authorities to rebel groups, civil society organisations, 
religious leaders etc.7   
2. It is important to note that this hybridity argument contains both a descriptive and a 
prescriptive component. First of all, there is the mere observation that the broader socio-
political environment in which TAF is intervening in Central and Western Mindanao is 
characterised by weak formal institutions, gravely attenuated by decades of armed conflict. 
Within this ‘weak state environment’, wherein the state does not manage to uphold its 
monopoly on the use of violence, one witnesses a strong resilience of all types of indigenous 
institutions which over time have dynamically merged with formal government institutions. 
Based on this observation, one is simply obliged to work with these hybrid institutions in 
order to strengthen the conflict resolution process.8 This appreciation of the formal state as 
being utterly weak, or even non-existent, in these parts of Mindanao is also shared by other 
international organisations operating in the region.9  However, apart from this descriptive 
argument, there also is a clear prescriptive component within this ToC wherein these hybrid 
institutions are understood as having an exceptional capacity to reach a sustainable settlement 
to violent disputes in the region. In other words, rather than being considered as a hindrance 
for effective conflict management, working with and through hybrid institutions is considered 
as an added value. For instance, it was argued that these informal and/or hybrid institutions 
enjoy a much higher legitimacy and social embeddedness as they are accessible to the 
majority of the population when compared to formal state institutions.10 In addition, their 
flexible character which leaves room for amicable settlement and all types of informal 
negotiations is seen as central to the sort of quick settlements TAF is aiming for. Their highly 
flexible character also makes them somehow ‘malleable’ for external organisations such as 
TAF. For instance, it was mentioned that a particular organisation, for example a business 
club or an association of Ulama (Muslim religious leaders), which intrinsically has little to do 
with dispute settlement, can be strategically ‘pushed’ to intervene in certain disputes. In short, 
the added value ascribed to these hybrid institutions is found in their accessibility/legitimacy 
                                                          
6
 TAF Philippines (2012), op.cit., p. 5 
7
 Mid-term workshop with members CMU, TAF Office Manila, 02.03.2013 
8
 TAF Philippines (2012), op.cit, p. 24 
9
 Informal meeting TAF/Ausaid, TAF office Manila, TAF Office Manila, 11.09.2013 
10
 Interview members TAF Cotabato office, TAF Office Cotabato, 20.03.2013 
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and their flexibility/malleability; which makes them preferential instruments to conduct 
certain conflict management interventions.  
3. This strategy of conflict management was considered as a ‘hybrid strategy of conflict 
management’ by different people in the TAF conflict management unit. The main rationale 
for considering this as a hybrid approach is the fact that a broad range of actors are being 
drawn into a coalition to put pressure on warring parties to refrain from using further 
violence. As this range of actors consists of a combination of informal public authorities such 
as traditional and religious leaders or rebel leaders on the one hand, and formal authorities 
such as AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) or PNP (Philippine National Police) 
personnel, politicians, bureaucrats on the other hand, these coalitions are understood as being 
hybrid.11 As explained by Willy Torres, head of the Conflict Management Unit until mid-
2013: ‘a collective effort is also a hybrid system in a sense’.12 In this regard, while the 
aforementioned interpretation of hybridity is understood through specific institutions, this 
second interpretation mainly plays at the level of certain actors/individuals.   
In short, the two large rationales that underlie the formulation of this particular ToC on conflict 
mediation are the crucial observations that, 1) the majority of the violence conducted in Mindanao has 
a local character and concerns local kinship groups (more specifically: clans), hence the need for a 
local response to these conflicts, 2) formal state institutions do not have sufficient capacity to cope 
with these local conflicts, hence the need/inevitability to work through hybrid/informal institutions. 
However, as became clear through different interviews and focus group discussions, these 
hybrid/informal institutions were also considered as having some exceptional opportunities for 
effective conflict management, due to their flexible character and strong social legitimacy. In 
addition, one extra understanding of this concept of hybridity could be discerned, wherein the actual 
strategy of conflict management itself can be labelled as hybrid if the organisation taps into a diverse 
pool of people coming from both formal and informal sectors of society.13 This is linked with a 
specific type of conflict management strategy in which (elite) coalitions and networks are established 
to put pressure on warring parties to refrain from using further violence and eventually reach a 
settlement for their dispute. 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The empirical and conceptual underpinning for this ToC is somewhat unbalanced. For the discussion 
about the nature of violent conflict in the region, an exceptionally elaborate qualitative and 
quantitative dataset is being used in the form of the published rido research project and the rido data 
set. However, the evidence base for a range of other claims that are being made within this ToC is 
much more limited. We are referring here in particular to what can be broadly defined as the specific 
institutional context in which TAF is intervening. It indeed makes sense to speak about a ‘weak state 
environment’ wherein the state is not the unique regulating institution, based on the observation that 
Central and Western Mindanao are characterised by decades of warfare and the presence of a range of 
armed groups. However, this observation also leaves many crucial questions unanswered. For 
instance, there is no systematic baseline study about the actual scale of penetration of state institutions 
                                                          
11
 Interview Rommel de la Rosa, TAF office Cotabato, 16.04.2013; Closing workshop with member CMU, TAF 
Office Manila, 29.04.2013. 
12
 Mid-term workshop with members CMU, TAF Office Manila, 02.03.2013. 
13
 In addition, it should be mentioned, that in particular among people working for different partner 
organisations in rural, peripheral areas, the concept of hybridity was hardly known or lacked a clear definition 
and common understanding. 
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in these regions or a potential spatial variation within this penetration (town versus countryside, island 
provinces versus mainland Mindanao, presence of AFP camps etc.).14 Moreover, as already argued 
elsewhere, the characterisation of this region as a ‘weak state environment’ might underestimate the 
manner in which armed commanders of different rebel groups have been actively involved within 
formal state institutions. This can either be done by directly participating in elections, working as a 
government employee, or becoming usurped by many of the state-sanctioned paramilitary 
organisations such as a CVO (Civilian Voluntary Organisation) or a CAFGU (Citizen Armed Forces 
Geographical Unit). We do not necessarily wish to counter the argument that the formal state is weak 
in Western Mindanao. However we think that there is a need for a more fine-grained and nuanced 
conceptual toolbox which can provide sharper insights about the specific modalities of state 
penetration in the region. This is closely related to the fact that a range of conceptual ambiguities 
remain concerning the institutional environment in which TAF is intervening. For instance, a great 
deal of obscurity remains concerning the distinction between informal versus hybrid institutions and 
how this interaction between the informal and formal should be understood. Are formal state 
institutions merely captured by kin-based social structures such as clans, or is there a true interaction 
between traditional practices/rituals and formal procedures within these institutions? Are these 
interactions more of an ad hoc nature or do we really see the emergence of a truly alternative and 
sustainable institutional sphere?  
While not all of these questions will be systematically answered throughout this paper, our objective 
is to bring some conceptual and empirical clarity within the discussions on hybrid institutions, based 
on a case study on conflict management institutions in the province of Lanao del Sur.  More 
specifically, two large rationales will be systematically elaborated upon: 1) the first objective with this 
paper is to test the ‘weak state authority’ hypothesis that clearly underpins the formulation of this 
specific conflict management strategy by TAF, but which is also being put forward by other 
international organisations working in the region. For instance, a UNDP report on peace and 
development in Mindanao openly speaks about the ‘deficient implementation capacity’ of local state 
institutions in the region in relation to conflict management and peace building.15 Are formal conflict 
management institutions non-existent, dysfunctional, and inaccessible - or merely subject to partisan 
interests, thereby losing their supposedly impersonal nature? How are the decisions by formal conflict 
management institutions enforced and what role do informal organisations such as non-state armed 
groups or religious scholars play in this?  2) A second large question that will be elaborated upon is 
whether the institutions through which TAF is working can effectively be approached as hybrid 
institutions, in the sense that they truly reflect an interaction of the formal and the informal. If that is 
the case, how do these interactions materialise, does this give rise to a new institutional sphere, and 
where exactly does the added value of these hybrid institutions lie within an objective to reach (more) 
sustainable peace in the region? After these two sections, a final section of the paper attempts to 
broaden the discussion by relating findings to some of the major arguments and debates within the 
broader Hybrid Political Order literature.    
                                                          
14
 Interestingly, a growing number of empirical case-studies claim that even in regions confronted with long-
term high-intensity violence and very low development indicators, state institutions might retain much more 
relevance than generally accounted for, and the so-called ‘image’ of the state remains a very powerful reference 
point, even for rebel groups. For an example, see: Hoffman, Kasper and Vlassenroot, Koen (2014) ‘Armed 
groups and the exercise of public authority: the cases of the Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South 
Kivu’, Peacebuilding, 2 (2), pp. 202-220. 
15
 Oquist, Paul (2000) Options for a Win-Win Solution in Mindanao. Multi-Donor Group Support for Peace and 
Development in Mindanao: Third Assessment Mission Report, Manila: United Nations Development Program, 
pp. 5-6. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The data for this research project were collected during a nine week research stay in the province of 
Lanao del Sur in the months of September and October, 2013. Throughout this research stay, an 
analysis has been made about conflict management institutions and the role played by TAF within 
these institutions, based on the aforementioned two research questions. The data were collected 
through qualitative semi-structured interviews and open focus group discussions. Within the selection 
of respondents and cases, 16  particular attention was paid to the role of customary/traditional 
authorities and religious leaders in the settlement of certain disputes and the way in which these are 
(or are not) engaged in formal institutions. However, as will be clear from the explanation below, it is 
of little analytical value dividing our respondents into fixed social categories such as ‘traditional 
leaders’, ‘civil society members’, or ‘politicians’, since the same person often combines different 
types of authority and displays a variety of identities. Secondly, considering the enormous variety 
within the category of traditional leaders - or at least people claiming a traditional leadership position 
based on a certain historical and genealogical narrative - the category of ‘traditional leader’ in the 
context of Lanao del Sur is subject to huge inflation and may not reveal that much about the actual 
social position a person has in a certain community. Finally, twenty semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with people directly or indirectly involved in conflict management initiatives in the region. 
These individual interviews were complemented with ten open Focus Group Discussions wherein we 
attempted to gauge dominant perceptions about the legitimacy, effectiveness, and accessibility of 
different conflict management institutions. In total, this amounts to around fifty-one hours of 
interview material of which roughly 80% has been recorded.17  The interviews and FGDs which 
constitute the empirical backbone of this research paper were complemented with an additional three3 
week visit to the city of Cotabato in January 2014. This visit focused on different gatekeepers within 
peacebuilding and conflict management activities at the regional, Mindanao level and the national, 
Philippine level. These interviews allowed for a better understanding of how different scales of 
interventions interact with each other and provided a better understanding of certain socio-political 
dynamics at the regional and national scale. In total, fifteen interviews were conducted, amounting to 
about sixteen hours of recorded interviews. Most of these interviews were conducted individually or 
with a small group of people. 
These primary data were complemented with a review of secondary literature which can be divided 
into three broad categories: 1) a review of existing literature on the conflict in Mindanao, with a 
specific focus on Lanao del Sur; 2) a review of existing literature on the state and state formation in 
the Philippines; 3) a review of the literature on hybridity in relation to conflict management and peace 
building. This literature will be introduced and discussed in the third section of this paper. 
 
                                                          
16
 For reasons of security, a decision was made not to undertake an in-depth case study in one specific 
municipality; as this would have required a more permanent presence of the researchers. Instead, we worked in a 
more general manner through short-term visits in a number of municipalities, which were situated in the vicinity 
Marawi,  the provincial capital of Lanao del Sur. In this manner, our research did not manage to collect complex 
micro-data on daily social interactions and power relations. On the other hand, the inclusion of a broader sample 
of research sites and a careful cross-checking of our data, allows us to draw some conclusions that have a wider 
geographic reach.        
17
 Recordings were not made in circumstances that we judged to be too sensitive, or where the respondent(s) did 
not give their permission for recordings. In those instances, written notes were taken.   
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PART 1: WEAK STATE AND STRONG TRADITIONS IN LANAO DEL 
SUR?  SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
1.1 THE WEAK STATE HYPOTHESIS WITHIN TAF AND PARTNER 
ORGANISATIONS 
The province of Lanao del Sur seems to be the ultimate textbook example of the weak state 
hypothesis. In a chapter written for the TAF book on Rido, Matuan states: ‘While the Philippine 
Constitution functions as the fundamental law of the land, in the pat a phangampong (indigenous 
polity), the so-called taritib ago igma serves as the fundamental law of the community’.18 In other 
words, indigenous institutions are considered to have a much stronger relevance and legitimacy 
among communities in Lanao del Sur when compared to formal governance structures. This view of 
weak state presence is closely linked with the observation that rido is rife within this province. Out of 
all the provinces covered in the rido study by TAF, Lanao del Sur has by far the highest prevalence of 
rido with 377 cases counted between the 1930s and 2005. 19  This is considerably higher when 
compared to the second highest province, Maguindanao with 218 cases counted. Following the 
rationale of this study which states that: ‘Revenge killings and feuds are typical in small-scale 
societies where - … - there is a lack of effective state control and authority’20, it logically follows that 
the province of Lanao del Sur must be among those provinces in the Philippines with the weakest 
state penetration.    
Following this line of thought, it is argued that due to the weakness of formal regulatory frameworks 
in Lanao del Sur, indigenous practices of conflict management are considered to be the most adequate 
- maybe even the only possible - venues to deal with violent tensions.21 This view was strongly 
supported by Rido Inc., a local NGO which has acted as a partner organisation for TAF in the 
province since 2007. Rido Inc. sees Maranao22 traditional institutions as the prime avenues for conflict 
mediation in the region, particularly in the case of clan conflicts since formal security and justice 
provisions lack social legitimacy within the communities. The argument is that the Maranao people 
consider these formal institutions as alien and imposed by a (post)-colonial state on a much older 
cultural tradition and social order which still enjoys a high legitimacy among the Maranao.23 As a 
consequence, it is suggested that the mechanisms and actors which have the capacity to deal with 
these feuds should be searched for within the informal and traditional ‘sector’ of society. Within this 
traditional and informal sector, a diversity of strategies are pursued by Rido Inc. One such strategy 
consists of the writing up of so-called clan genealogies wherein common ancestry is demonstrated 
between rival clans. It is hoped that this proof of common ancestry will serve as a common ground 
through which the feuding clans will then reconcile. This strategy of clan genealogy is complemented 
by informal reconciliation meetings between traditional authorities/elders that are generally concluded 
                                                          
18
 Matuan, Moctar I. (2007) Inventory of Existing Rido in Lanao del Sur (1994 –2004) in Wilfredo Magno 
Torres III (ed.), Rido. Clan feuding and conflict management in Mindanao. Manila: The Asia Foundation, pp. 
71-97. 
19
 Torres, Wilfredo Magno (2007b), Introduction in  Wilfredo Magno Torres III (ed.), Rido. Clan feuding and 
conflict management in Mindanao. Manila: The Asia Foundation Torres, p. 16. 
20
 Torres, Wilfredo Magno (2007b), op.cit, p. 17. 
21
 Matuan, Moctar I. (2007), op.cit, p. 72. 
22
 The term ‘Maranao’ does not solely capture the people living in the provincial capital Marawi but refers to an 
ethnic group, which originates from a region around lake Lanao and which is mainly situated in the provinces of 
Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte.  
23
 FGD Rido Inc., Illigan, 20.02.2013. 
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by reaching a consensus on the amount of blood money that needs to be paid to compensate for the 
harm inflicted. These interventions fit within a broader strategy of so-called ‘clan organising’ 
wherein, through a consultative process facilitated by Rido Inc., attempts are made to reach a stronger 
and more fixed system of traditional governance. For obvious reasons, reconstructing a clan 
genealogy on which a consensus exists is key for the successful completion of this exercise.  
This long-term attempt at clan organising relates to conflict management and peace building, albeit in 
a more general and preventive manner: 1) by imposing a stricter system of traditional governance 
wherein rules and regulations are clear and considered as legitimate, it is hoped that the numerous 
violent conflicts erupting due to ambiguities in the succession of traditional positions, clan affiliations, 
traditional landownership etc. will be reduced, 2) by imposing a transparent system of traditional 
leadership, it is expected that these traditional leaders will enjoy enough legitimacy, power, and 
popularity to act as capable conflict mediators. However, it was admitted that not all of these 
traditional leaders have the capacity to perform mediation. Therefore, Rido Inc. attempted to build up 
a privileged working relationship with a selection of leaders they considered as credible ‘problem 
solvers’24  3) it is a widely held belief, not only among the members of Rido Inc. but also among 
many other people we  interviewed, that the weakening of traditional Maranao culture is responsible 
for the prevalence of rido. Therefore, this reinstatement of tradition which is supposed to act as a 
moral compass, should result in a decline of violent feuds, or at least enable a more effective and 
quick settlement. This moral compass largely fits with the aforementioned ‘taritib ago igma’ in the 
book chapter by Matuan, that can best be understood as a highly flexible set of Maranao norms, 
values, and principles. According to an expert on Maranao traditional law, this ‘taritib ago igma’ 
supposedly ‘provides a venue for dialogue among the community members.’25 Importantly, these 
efforts should not be understood as an exercise whereby Rido Inc. searches for a literal and 
historically correct reinstatement of cultural practices. Rather, tradition is here understood as an 
inspiration wherein attempts are being made to reinvent, or at least to give new meanings to, certain 
traditional practices.26 For instance, so-called ‘modern’ criteria are being drafted for eligibility as a 
traditional leader. One of these criteria is the prohibition for traditional leaders to participate in 
politics.27 However, as will be demonstrated below - at least for this specific criterion - the capacity of 
Rido Inc. to effectively enforce this seems limited.     
1.2 THE WANING OF TRADITION AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
This framing of Lanao del Sur as a weak state environment on the one hand, and as having strong 
traditional institutions/leaders on the other, was not supported by our fieldwork findings. However, 
before delving deeper into these data, it is worth referring back to the aforementioned rido study by 
TAF. Within this study, some remarkable quantitative data are put forward that are not fully 
elaborated on within the book but which seem at odds with the weak state argument. For instance, in 
the chapter on Lanao del Sur, it is indicated that the largest group of people mediating in cases of rido 
between 1994 and 2004 consisted of politicians.28 In total, about 89 politicians attempted to mediate 
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in rido conflicts, followed by 68 traditional leaders and 13 religious leaders. Although these data need 
be to approached with some caution, considering the great overlap between the category of traditional 
leader and politician, this at least gives an indication that people occupying a political mandate are 
important actors in the intervention of violent disputes. Secondly, the fact that ‘politics’ is being 
considered as the most important cause of rido in Lanao del Sur gives an indication that access to the 
state is at least worth competing and fighting for.29 If formal authority structures indeed would be as 
weak as generally represented, it is hard to imagine that this would be the number one cause of clan 
feuds in the province.  
What these quantitative data thus seem to suggest is that state/politicians/elections might matter more 
than accounted for and that the supposed omnipotence of traditional institutions/leaders might be 
overrated. By and large, this corresponds with our own qualitative findings. Overall, a surprising 
consensus existed that traditional leaders were not the ultimate centres of authority and decision-
making in the community and that over the past decades, their influence has steadily been waning. 
Interestingly, this was above all admitted by several Sultans and other traditional leaders themselves. 
As mentioned by the Sultan of the (once-famous) Sultanate of Baloi: ‘Before the Spaniards came, we 
were the rulers’ and this Sultan saw in the imposition of ‘democracy’ and formal ‘state-like’ 
governance (both colonial and post-colonial) a sharp decline in the power of the real, true Sultans, 
descending from a noble blood line. Instead, this system has put another type of actor at the forefront 
of the political arena; people with resources. As he stated: ‘From my own point of view, democracy is 
designed for the rich people’. 30  This observation was based on an account that ascribed key 
importance to reciprocal clientelistic relations in the current local political arena; a point we will touch 
upon later. Due to the imposition of this modern democracy, this Sultan only perceived his title as a 
‘decoration’ and as a result, considers that he does not have the capacity to settle disputes between 
and within clans.31 Similar statements were made throughout different interviews with other Sultans -
admitting their dwindling authority and explaining this by the intrusion of a modern state.32 For 
instance, the sultan of Taporog literally stated: ‘Today, the Sultanates are disenfranchised under the 
constitution. They reduce us to non-entities. It is only by name. But before; the word of the Sultan is 
final. No one can contradict the decision of the Sultan…’ 33   Apart from these interviews with 
individual traditional leaders, these observations were also confirmed through different FGD’s and 
individual interviews in which a consensus existed that power had shifted from the traditional field 
towards formal statehood.34  
These data already provide some important nuances to the ‘weak state/strong tradition’ paradigm in a 
sense that traditional leaders see themselves as occupying only a subordinate position in society when 
compared to a ‘glorious’ past where they considered themselves as the ultimate centres of authority. 
While a systematic explanation for this observation would undoubtedly need a more elaborate 
historical analysis, at least two indicative observations can be put forward. First, Sultans – at least in 
the municipalities around Lake Lanao - no longer allocate land to followers. In different places all 
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over the world, this capacity to allocate land still constitutes the basis for traditional/customary 
authority as it enables these leaders to obtain control over people and their livelihoods in rural 
economies. While it was admitted that around lake Lanao, Sultans historically had had control over 
land, over the centuries this control had been waning as land was given away to many families and 
these plots were never returned to the Sultan. Instead, these have become further subdivided to 
children/grandchildren over different generations. Apart from the fact that this has given emergence to 
a complex web of oral and insecure land claims and disputes over inheritance rights and land 
boundaries, this has considerably circumscribed the power of the Sultan. As explained by the Sultan 
of Taporog, in the early days: ‘No one could contradict the decision of the Sultan because all the 
ancestral domain was controlled by the Sultan. If the farmer is not a good one at developing the land, 
the sultan will award it to a good one…’ 35 Yet, as he further explained, this authority has evaporated, 
resulting in a serious decline of the Sultan’s power in the community. A second explanatory factor 
that was systematically mentioned to account for the dwindling leverage of traditional leaders, is their 
lack of access to substantial financial resources. To put it more bluntly, as one respondent in an FGD 
stated: ‘Traditional leaders are just like us, poor and uneducated.’ 36  As we will discuss more 
extensively below, this constitutes a particular problem since patronage funds are vital assets in the 
build-up of power and authority in the region.  
Yet, despite this assessment that the power of traditional institutions/traditional leaders might not be 
so prominent, it would also be an inadequate assessment of the complexities of the socio-political 
landscape in Lanao to simply reverse this into a weak tradition versus strong politicians/state 
argument. As already mentioned in our methodological introduction, one should be careful not to 
think in fixed social categories as many of these overlap. As we will illustrate, it is in particular 
throughout this overlap that a considerable differentiation can be detected within the category of 
traditional leaders; wherein a part of this group has managed to position themselves as the ultimate 
centers of authority in the community. 
 1.3 THE OMNIPRESENCE OF ELECTORAL POLITICS  
Based on our data, it is clear that the capacity to win elections is among the most critical factors in 
explaining whether traditional leaders still manage to retain their authority. In order to empirically 
illustrate this point, it is interesting to refer back to the story of the Sultan of Baloi. While admitting 
that his title as Sultan of Baloi did not amount to much, things started to change for the Sultan when 
his brother became elected as a barangay captain. As explained by different authors37, the local 
executive in the Philippines has historically always been entitled to control coercive institutions. In 
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particular, these local executives have control over the PNP and a wide range of state-sanctioned 
coercive organisations (e.g. CVO, CAFGU, Barangay Tanods). In this specific case, a decision was 
made by the barangay captain to establish a CVO to tackle the rising night-time criminal activities 
along the highway between the towns of Marawi and Illigan. It was the Sultan who was appointed by 
his brother to head this CVO of about 100 people. For obvious reasons, the subsequent decline in 
criminal activity as a result of the regular nightly patrols of the CVO, significantly added to the 
symbolic and political capital, not only of the Sultan himself but also of the Sultanate of Baloi more 
generally, of which he was the symbolic representative.  
This short story is illustrative for a broader dynamic which can be discerned all over the region. First, 
as already discussed, traditional authority as such no longer has a strong material basis (e.g. land, 
financial resources), neither does it have a truly enforceable legal and/or coercive basis. However, all 
of these material, legal and coercive means to exert influence and authority can be accessed through 
elected office. State formation in the Philippines has always been characterised by a high degree of 
autonomy by local politicians in the periphery vis-à-vis Manila. This autonomy has always been 
prominent in the way state-sanctioned coercive organisations ranging from the PNP to different para-
military structures have been organised, not only at more decentralised levels, but also under the 
direct tutelage of elected politicians.38 This is clear from the aforementioned story of the Sultan of 
Baloi. Although the Sultan himself was not elected, his family connection with his brother/barangay 
captain enabled him to become the leader of a CVO.39 This dynamic, wherein politicians/traditional 
leaders actively deploy their authority over these organisations for private or wider clan purposes, is 
nothing new in the region. Particularly revealing in this regard is a book chapter by the American 
anthropologist G. Carter Bentley on Mohamad Ali Dimaporo.40 Dimaporo, who is also of noble 
descent, was appointed in 1976 as acting governor of Lanao del Sur by president Marcos. Within this 
capacity and through different connections with mayors and barangay captains, Dimaporo began 
recruiting massive numbers of members for so-called Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) units 
that were used as a private army to suppress any form of opposition or dissent in the province. Thus, 
under the tutelage of Dimaporo, the Marcos regime managed to organise an extensive counter 
insurgency against the MNLF and any other oppositional organisations of the time. In the meantime, 
the creation of these types of para-military private armies in combination with the start of an armed 
insurgency in the beginning of the seventies, gravely intensified the often violent nature of political 
competition in the region. Tellingly, Dimaporo ultimately lost his position as governor of Lanao del 
Sur after the outbreak of the People Power Revolution against President Marcos in 1986, not due to 
democratic procedures but because the rivaling alliance of clans violently captured the city of Marawi 
while Dimaporo was away.41  
Apart from access to coercive means through elected office, a second pivotal basis for political 
authority was understood as the capacity for patronage. As mentioned in one FGD: ‘If you have a 
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good salary you will get more respect’ as this enables one ‘to support the community’.42 This was also 
admitted by politicians/traditional leaders who considered this practice of patronage/support towards 
the community as a heavy burden.43 For instance, the sultan of Toros (who was not a politician 
himself but whose family members monopolised all relevant political positions at the barangay at the 
time of the interview) estimated that 60% of all his financial resources were spent on so-called 
‘community services’.44 There thus existed an expectation among large parts of the population that 
elected politicians should have a symbolic ‘open door’ to their house, as they should  be accessible in 
case financial or other sorts of support were needed for community members. Based on the idea that 
when one lends something to somebody, one day this should be returned, this seemed to be 
particularly the case in relation to elections. When support (votes, participation in rallies, hanging of a 
banners etc.) was given to a certain politician at campaign time, it was expected that this would be 
returned.45 In addition, the qualities ascribed to good leadership were often founded not on a refusal of 
this practice of patronage but rather on the particular ways these funds were (or were not) distributed.  
This omnipresence of patronage in local politics in the province of Lanao del Sur is both a 
confirmation and somewhat of an aberration of a broader trend which plays out in the country as a 
whole. A particular historical pattern of state formation in the Philippines has always been 
characterised by vertically organised patronage networks tying the periphery to the political centre in 
Manila.46 Local politicians are the pivotal actors within these networks as they deliver votes to higher-
ranking politicians in exchange for state resources, often referred to as ‘pork barrel’. Once more, this 
became obvious in the recent controversies concerning the so-called ‘Pork Barrel Scam’, wherein 
huge amounts of PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Funds) disappeared into the pockets of 
senators and congressional representatives through the establishment of phony NGOs. While 
discussions about this scandal focused on the ‘corrupt nature’ of politics in the Philippines, since 
many of these funds were siphoned off, this should foremost be understood as an illustration of how 
these PDAF funds acted as pivotal sources of patronage in two ways. First, it enabled the political 
centre in Manila to tie local politicians to them by providing them with funds over which they had a 
great deal of autonomy.47 Secondly, these PDAF funds were being used strategically by congressmen 
to expand their political base, since they spent them on projects in their home region, thereby 
rewarding political allies and selectively buying in oppositional actors and organisations.48 While 
these PDAF funds were destined for higher-ranking congressmen, by and large, the same dynamic 
plays out at the level of the municipality (mayor) and the barangay (barangay captain). Of central 
importance for these local institutional scales are the so-called IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) 
funds which gained particular in importance after the 1991 decentralisation. In short, patronage state 
funding to reward followers, or to ward off oppositional coalitions, have always been at the heart of 
the political landscape throughout the Philippines. The privileged access to these funds gives a tactical 
political advantage over political opponents who remain deprived of these resources. Hence, the 
establishment of true oligarchic dynasties comes about, wherein political control often remains within 
the same elite coalition/family over different decades. As already remarked by Alfred McCoy in 1993, 
the emergence of powerful political families all over the Philippines should be explained by, 1) the 
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rise of ‘rents’ as a significant share of the nation’s economy and 2) a simultaneous attenuation of 
central government control over the provinces.49 If one changes the concept of ‘family’ into ‘clan’, it 
is not so hard to see that the whole of Muslim Mindanao is following some very similar dynamics to 
the rest of the Philippines.   
For these reasons, the practice wherein ‘you support the community’ by distributing IRA funding, is 
definitely not something uniquely Maranao. On the other hand, this practice needs to be situated 
within a wider socio-economic landscape which is different compared to other places in the 
Philippines. Above all, the economic situation in Lanao del Sur is characterised by an exceptionally 
high degree of poverty and a very low level of capitalisation/industrialisation. For instance, in the 
2013 Philippine Human Development Report,50 the province of Lanao del Sur consistently ranks 
among the lowest on different development indicators. According to data by the National Statistical 
Coordination Board of the province, published by Mindanews, the province of Lanao del Sur was the 
poorest province of the whole country in 2012 with a poverty incidence of 68.9%, compared to a 
national average of 22.3%.51 Lastly, intermittent periods of warfare between Muslim armed groups 
and the Philippine state and a political climate characterised by regular violent feuding, obstructed a 
structural development of a substantial industrial or service economy.  Within this specific socio-
economic landscape, the state, even more than in other parts of the Philippines, becomes the prime 
source of rent generation and job opportunities. As such, very much in line with the way customary 
authority was historically founded on control over land that defined people’s livelihood in a rural 
economy, in many places in Lanao del Sur today, the one controlling state resources has a huge 
control over people’s daily livelihoods in what can largely be defined as a state-led economy.   
1.4 RIDO AND POLITICS 
These two specific features - control over the means of coercion and access to state patronage in a 
region which is characterised by a high level of poverty - make the state the key arbiter in the way 
power relations are constituted in the region. It is also against this background that the issue of rido 
and clan needs to be understood, making clan a highly political concept in Lanao del Sur.52 Clans are 
flexible kin-based social networks wherein clan affiliation runs along different genealogies. 
According to Carter Bentley, Maranao culture is characterised by so-called bilateral descent 
reckoning, wherein the succession of descent lines happens through both parents.53 Quite logically, 
after a couple of generations this gives emergence to what Carter Bentley describes as a ‘genealogical 
mare’s nest’, wherein ‘Each claimant is likely to possess several claims of varying quality to each 
title, and no simple algorithm can predict which will take precedence’.54 Although Carter Bentley 
made this statement based on fieldwork in Lanao in the 1907s, this argument still applies to 
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contemporary Maranao culture as clan affiliations take all sorts of directions. At the same time, a 
historical lineage to a ‘noble blood line’ can be claimed by a very large share of the population. This 
genealogical complexity and the never-ending controversies between ‘real’ Sultans and ‘fake’ Sultans 
was one of the main reasons why TAF’s partner organisation Rido Inc. insisted on writing up 
definitive clan genealogies that could shed an ‘authoritative’ light on these contentions. Not 
surprisingly, these clan genealogies could easily run into thousands of pages.  
Thus, clans are not fixed units but should instead be approached as alliances in which membership is 
negotiable and belonging is fluid, especially at the level of the smaller sub-clans.55 For instance, in the 
run-up to the municipal elections in 2013 in the municipality of Kapatagan, different sub-clans were 
intensively discussing which candidate to support.56 When a final decision was ultimately made, a so-
called kanduli or celebration was organised to openly state support for one particular candidate that 
placed this sub-clan within the coalition of the ‘mother clan’. However, these alliances are never fixed 
and can easily change in the run-up to new elections. The highly flexible character of clan 
membership and related traditional positions was remarkable and was considered by many as an 
important added value of the traditional system. In some cases, this flexibility in relation to clan 
membership and traditional positions could take a remarkably pragmatic turn. For instance, as 
explained by the Sultan of Toros, Lomela Imam: ‘When we were building our mosque, we needed 
extra money, to solicit extra money we made 5 sultans’.57 Quite logically, these types of practices 
have caused an inflation in the number of Sultans over the past decades and people have started 
complaining about issues of ‘corruption’ or ‘moral degradation’ affecting this traditional field. As 
stated by one history professor at Mindanao State University in Marawi: ‘… every day Sultans are 
being enthroned, young kids call themselves Sultans. Who would ever believe them?’58     
This complexity does not mean that clear-cut fault lines did not previously exist between different 
clans or constellations of clans. For instance, Maranao politics has historically always been 
characterised by a fierce competition between the Alonto clan, which has been associated with the 
Muslim armed groups, and the Dimaporo clan, which has been associated with numerous 
counterinsurgency efforts by Manila.59  However, in other cases, contradictions are not so fixed, 
especially at the level of the so-called sub-clan which has a more distant affiliation to the mother clan. 
Within these schisms, although this is definitely no ‘simple algorithm’,60 these clan affiliations are 
mainly constituted against the background of access to state patronage.61 The majority of conflicts that 
were recorded throughout our qualitative fieldwork therefore played out between clans and were 
mostly related to electoral politics. In general, these conflicts tended to have a strong bipartisan 
character, wherein obvious tensions exist between a coalition of ‘losers’ (opposition) and a coalition 
of ‘winners’ (incumbent administration). Due to the reasons described above (privileged access to 
state patronage and control coercive organisations), it tends to be a quality of the incumbent 
administration to systematically win successive elections. 62  In a number of the municipalities 
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researched, these bipartisan political tensions were followed by one or more murders. 63  In the 
municipality of Kapatagan, members of one specific clan openly confirmed that they were actively 
mobilising young men and collecting firearms after they had (unexpectedly) lost the elections a 
couple of months before our field visit.64 These findings correspond with the data derived from the 
TAF rido study, wherein ‘politics’ is considered to be the prime source of rido in the province. In this 
regard, rather than ascribing rido to state weakness, rido should be analysed in relation to an 
omnipresent state as the ultimate source of power, patronage and prestige.    
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In this first section, we have challenged the ‘weak state/strong traditions’ argument which served as a 
guiding rationale for the specific conflict management strategy deployed by TAF and its partner 
organisations in Lanao del Sur. Importantly, our critique does not intend to turn the tables simply into 
a reverse ‘strong state/weak traditions’ argument. It is correct that tradition per se lacks a coercive or 
material basis for effective authority claims and the specific ‘symbolic capital’ supposedly associated 
with this traditional leadership seems to be confined. Rather, there existed a consensus that politicians 
were the most powerful people in the community. Remarkably, however, throughout our different 
interviews and FGDs, not one politician could be encountered who did not claim lineage to a noble 
blood line and in many cases, the mayor or barangay captain was a traditional leader him/herself. In 
other words, a remarkable convergence seemed to exist between politics and tradition in Lanao del 
Sur, that directly serves as the prime explanation for the internal social differentiation in terms of such 
things as status, wealth, and influence that could be encountered among traditional leaders. The need 
to combine a traditional position with an elected mandate was also felt strongly among many 
traditional leaders. As explained by the Sultan of the Mariato Tara clan: ‘The advantage of the dual 
position is that the people respect you, recognize you, they will follow you whatever you say. If you 
are PNP, mayor nobody will oppose you because the people have a big respect for you.’65   
What all these statements point to is that the state cannot just be cast away as a ‘lame duck’ but 
instead is a pivotal player in the socio-political landscape. The state in Lanao del Sur can indeed not 
be understood as an ideal type, impersonal Weberian bureaucracy. Very much on the contrary, the 
state in Lanao del Sur is utterly personalised considering the exceptionally high leverage the local 
executive has in the allocation of state patronage funds and the composition of state sanctioned 
coercive organisations. However, it is precisely throughout this personalised character that the state in 
Lanao del Sur obtains its relevance.  Therefore, the weak state hypothesis needs deeper elaboration 
and is inappropriate, as it is formulated today, to adequately assess the socio-political landscape in 
Lanao del Sur (and presumably also in other places in Mindanao).  Rather, a more adequate analysis 
should start from a better insight into the everyday practices of patronage/control over livelihoods and 
coercion, which still constitute the basis of power and authority in the region.  
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PART 2: HYBRID INSTITUTIONS OR HYBRID PRACTICES OF 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT  
The fundamental question that follows from the observations above, is what effect all this has on the 
workings of conflict management and dispute settlement in the region. Does the omnipresence of state 
and electoral politics in Lanao del Sur imply that formal conflict management institutions have the 
necessary capacity and legitimacy to cope with violent tensions? Is the reach of traditional conflict 
management institutions systematically being overrated? And how to account for the utterly 
personalised capture of state institutions? In short, how do we estimate the effectiveness of different 
conflict management institutions in a socio-political landscape which can be understood as consisting 
of quasi-authoritarian enclaves wherein the local executive has a near total monopoly over coercive 
organisations and privileged access to state patronage funds? 
2.2 FORMAL PUNITIVE JUSTICE VERSUS AMICABLE SETTLEMENT  
Before we can start delving deeper into some of these questions, it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of how people interpret and give meaning to some of the categories and concepts which 
are key to the ToC as it is formulated by TAF. As explained above, although the concept of hybridity 
is formulated as an interaction between formal and informal institutions, how and at what level this 
interaction should be understood, and how sustainable these interactions are considered to be, remains 
vague. Moreover, in daily conversation and consultation, rather than pointing at a true interaction, this 
concept of hybridity was primarily used to denote the prominence of informal institutions and the 
limited capacity of formal governance structures.  
Interestingly, when discussing conflict management and dispute settlement with a variety of 
respondents, the crucial distinction that was made was not one between a set of formal versus 
informal conflict management institutions, but rather one of formal punitive justice versus amicable 
settlement/informal reconciliation. The difference between these two practices of conflict 
management is obvious. With formal punitive justice, a whole range of formal state procedures is 
being referred to, through which a perpetrator(s) is charged and then judged by a court. On the other 
hand, amicable settlement is understood as a process of informal consultation wherein conflicting 
parties try to reach an agreement to their dispute. In general, this consultation is then concluded 
through an agreement on the amount of blood money that needs to be paid as compensation for the 
harm inflicted. The fundamental issue here is that amicable settlement cannot simply be equated with 
traditional or informal institutions, but is also practiced through different types of formal governance 
structures. This is a crucial observation if one truly wants to grasp the complexities and hybrid 
characteristics of conflict management in Lanao. However, before elaborating more systematically on 
this issue, it is necessary first to give an assessment of the specific positive and negative evaluations 
made of these two conflict management practices.  
Overall, it was obvious that people had a much more positive assessment of amicable settlement when 
compared to formal justice delivery. However, one should be careful not to give a uniquely culturalist 
interpretation for this observation as if ‘the Maranao’ would consider any form of formal justice 
delivery intrusive or incompatible to their cultural practices. Although differing opinions existed on 
this matter, numerous respondents did not consider formal justice delivery through formal state 
institutions as something negative per se. On the contrary, although it was regularly pointed out that 
minor incidents could be settled perfectly well through amicable settlement, many deemed it desirable 
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that large-scale violent incidents and offences such as murder would be settled by formal and neutral, 
impersonal state institutions.66 Therefore, the critique that was being formulated did not necessarily 
concern the nature of formal punitive justice. Rather, there was an overall negative appreciation about 
the slowness and bureaucratic nature of formal justice delivery as it exists at this very moment.67 As 
stated by one respondent: ‘The wheels of justice are so slow at grinding that people take the right into 
their own hands’.68 Moreover, due to the high financial costs associated with this formal punitive 
justice, it was considered to be inaccessible for the majority of the population. 69  As a result, 
preference was given to faster practices of mediation and amicable settlement. In particular, the speed 
with which a settlement could be reached through amicable settlement was considered as extremely 
important, since any further escalation of the conflict/rido could be avoided as quickly as possible.70 
Another advantage that was mentioned is that a process of informal mediation and reconciliation is 
much more sustainable when compared to formal punitive justice. As some people stated, when 
somebody was incarcerated for a couple of years, the rido simply started again when this particular 
person was released from prison. This was not considered the case with amicable settlement as a 
consensus was reached between the parties/families involved. For all these reasons, the large majority 
of the disputes in Lanao del Sur are being handled through amicable settlement rather than formal 
adjudication. Importantly, these findings confirm earlier observations that were made in other parts of 
Muslim Mindanao for this research project.71 
2.2 THE HYBRID NATURE OF INFORMAL RECONCILIATION 
As mentioned, it would be wrong to situate these initiatives of reconciliation and amicable settlement 
uniquely within a traditional/informal institutional field. It is therefore crucial to make a clear 
conceptual distinction between certain practices of conflict management and the specific institutional 
fora or arena wherein these are being deployed. This is particularly obvious when studying the 
‘formal’ institution of the Municipal Peace and Order council. This council was originally set up by 
the Marcos regime as a counterinsurgency instrument against all forms of (armed) opposition to his 
regime.72 Currently, these Peace and Order Councils/Committees are composed of the counterparts of 
government agencies and are respectively chaired by the municipal mayor or barangay captain.73 
There is also a mandatory representation of civil society, which can consist of a range of organisations 
including traditional and religious ones. Above all, however, this council stands under direct control 
of the local executive and therefore uniquely consists of allies/relatives of the incumbent 
administration. Quite logically, since the major objective of these councils is understood as being 
‘deliberation of major issues and problems affecting peace and order, including insurgency”74, they 
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constituted the foremost and first place wherein the settlement of violent disputes and feuds was 
discussed.75 Yet, the procedural logic, through which many of the cases were settled, was of an utterly 
informal nature despite close supervision by the Council and/or the local executive.76 Due to this 
informal nature, the actual process of mediation was highly diverse and case-specific, as the parties 
concerned had a great say over the actual sequence of the events. When studying this amicable 
settlement, two important remarks need to be made. Firstly, a general sense of ownership exists as the 
parties themselves can determine the intensity, sequence and overall speed of the consultation process. 
Secondly, despite the supervision of politicians, an important place for traditional leaders as the ‘one’s 
knowing the right words’ still remained and thereby added symbolic weight to the whole process.77 
Herein, customary practices provide some sort of script or ceremonial logic through which the 
amicable settlement could be organised. At the same time, this puts forward different normative 
standards. For instance, various public manifestations are organised where the parties concerned have 
to swear not to break certain vows that are considered as key to the successful conclusion of the whole 
process.78  
This hybridity wherein an interaction takes place between traditional/informal practices of mediation 
within formal state institutions, occurs not only in the Peace and Order Council/Committee. Even 
when a case is filed in a formal court, it could be decided that the case will be referred to other 
agencies where a process of informal consultation and amicable settlement will be organised. As was 
confirmed by one attorney working in the city of Illigan, different venues exist where what he called 
‘alternative dispute resolution’ was being applied. The advantages that this attorney ascribed to 
alternative dispute resolution are very similar to those that were expressed in the more general FGD’s, 
namely: flexibility, ownership and the swiftness of the whole process. Within alternative dispute 
resolution a surprising variety of arenas were mentioned, such as annexes to the court, the prosecutor 
or police officers through which amicable settlement could be reached in a perfectly legal way.79 In 
addition, the Philippines has been experimenting for a while with so-called ‘Judicial Dispute 
Resolution’ in the First And Second Level Courts of the Philippine Judicial System.80 Through this 
‘Judicial Dispute Resolution’, it is expected that: ‘mediation and conciliation at the level of the judge 
would contribute significantly to the resolution of mediatable cases, thereby increasing the 
satisfaction of litigants in the court process and also helping to decongest the dockets of the 
judiciary.’81 In other words, a whole range of formalised legal spaces exists through which amicable 
settlement can be reached and this does not necessarily create contradictions and is something that is 
necessarily being practiced in the shadow of Philippine judicial law. All these types of mediation 
therefore come close to what TAF considers as hybrid institutions of conflict management as the 
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practice of amicable settlement cannot just be confined to the traditional or informal sphere. Rather, 
different types of formal institutions come to act as venues wherein these practices of mediation are 
being applied. Or as sultan Shatta Raraco, member of the Municipal Peace and Order Council in 
Binidayan stated when asked about the distinction between formal and informal conflict management: 
‘In fact, it is hard to put in a diagram’.82  
2.3 RECONCILIATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY  
Notwithstanding this high level of hybridity and complexity, a large consensus on one aspect of this 
process of amicable settlement existed, namely that this was a costly enterprise. First of all, there is 
the organisation of public meetings, at which a wide range of authorities are supposed to be present 
and food and drink are provided for the whole community.83 Secondly, the payment of blood money 
constitutes a central part of amicable settlement practices and in general, it is the third party mediator 
who is considered to be responsible for the payment of this blood money.84 In some other cases, blood 
money was paid by the mediator and/or the culprit For instance, in the municipality of Kapatagan, an 
arrangement existed that 50% had to be paid by the perpetrator and 50% by the mediator. This first 
50% did not necessarily have to come out of the pockets of the culprit him/herself and this was often 
provided by a patron or richer member of the family. Quite remarkably, however, this other 50% was 
simply understood as money coming from the LGU (Local Government Unit), thus directly indicating 
the close relationship between the role of politicians as mediators and the fact that state resources are 
directly used in these practices.85 This clearly hints at a hybrid interaction between a traditional 
practice (payment of blood money) and a formal governance structure (Peace and Order Council), 
through government funds (IRA). In general, it is very rare that blood money is paid by the culprit 
him/herself and in general, this is taken care of on his/her behalf by people with access to substantial 
financial resources. However, considering that the state is the foremost source of rent generation in 
the region, having access to state resources, more particularly IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) 
funds, was considered to be the foremost condition for becoming a capable mediator. As mentioned in 
one FGD: ‘All needs, all resources are in the LGU and money is very important to settle these 
cases’.
86
 This was also considered as an important added value of the Municipal Peace and Order 
Council, as this institution stood under the direct control of the mayor who was considered to have the 
necessary financial resources for mediation and whose decision was considered to be binding.87 On 
the other hand, the intervention of traditional leaders was considered as less fundamental, apart from 
providing some sort of symbolic weight. The explanation for this goes back to observations made 
earlier, namely the lack of access to financial resources and a lack of control over any credible 
coercive organisations by these traditional leaders. This was also confirmed through an interview with 
the Sultan of Tara wherein he stated that ‘The power of the sultan is grabbed by the mayors, barangay 
captains. They can give money to the offended party. The people lose their confidence in the sultan 
because we do not have money, can’t solve the problems… We lost power and control over people in 
the barangay’88  
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This citation cannot only be understood as a confirmation of the secondary role played by traditional 
leaders, this also points to the practice of conflict management as key in the build-up of authority and 
credible leadership. This could also be witnessed in the presence of a whole range of politicians, army 
and police personnel, and traditional leaders at public reconciliation meetings. Although most of these 
people did not play a substantial role in the peaceful conclusion of a dispute, these public appearances 
should be understood as attempts to take some of the credit for the initiative. As argued elsewhere, 
mediation is a primary ‘route to power’ as this ultimately demonstrates a range of capacities which are 
central to the build-up of public authority.89 As a result, it is as much in the interest of the mediating 
third party to reach a successful settlement as it is for the two disputing parties. Reaching a settlement 
hereby demonstrates the capacity to make people comply with certain decisions; and there is a 
demonstrated capacity for careful deliberation and consultation in a volatile environment. Also, the 
reinstatement of an overall climate of sustainable peace tends to be something that is welcomed by 
large parts of the population. Although stronger ethnographic data based on a longer period of 
fieldwork in one locality are needed to fully substantiate this claim, our fieldwork data indicate that 
the prominence of amicable settlement confirms existing power relations, and reinforces the position 
of elected politicians.   
2.4 CONCLUSION 
As explicitly mentioned in one focus group discussion in the municipality of Poona Piagapo: ‘If you 
are in the government, you can still implement the traditional law’.90 The most important conclusion 
that can be drawn from this second part therefore is that one clearly sees the emergence of something 
that can be called hybrid institutions of conflict management in Lanao del Sur. This hybridity should 
be understood as an interaction wherein formal governance institutions serve as venues in which 
informal practices of conflict mediation are being deployed. These informal practices can be divided 
into two major parts: (i) a more general process of informal consultation wherein a third party acts as 
a mediator between the two conflicting parties. We have illustrated this point through the formal 
institution of the Peace and Order Council/Committee which served as an institutional arena wherein 
amicable settlement and reconciliation could be discussed and monitored. Importantly, legal spaces 
are also provided within formal criminal law, where amicable settlement can be reached. Therefore, it 
would be wrong to understand this amicable settlement as something by definition conducted outside, 
or in the shadow of, formal law; (ii) in varying degrees, a range of cultural practices are being 
deployed within this amicable settlement which add a certain symbolic weight but above all serve as 
normative anchor points which provide a structure and sequence to this process. In particular two 
issues stand out in this regard: the importance of a public ceremony (kanduli) wherein both parties 
swear not to break the agreement; and the payment of blood money as a compensation for the harm 
inflicted. However, none of this can be put in some sort of fixed scenario. For instance, there are cases 
in which the party on the victim’s side has refused to receive any blood money; although preference 
was given for a process of amicable settlement. As such, this hybrid interaction is above all of a 
highly improvised, variable and ad hoc nature. This is also one of the main advantages ascribed to  
amicable settlement, in the sense that this flexibility presumes a genuine sense of ownership and 
agency. Moreover, if it is pursued by the parties concerned, this process can be exceptionally fast 
when compared to formal punitive justice. In any strategy of conflict management this is an 
unmistakable advantage, as this considerably reduces the possibility of a further escalation of the 
dispute. Nevertheless, despite the prominence of this informal amicable settlement, we have also 
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illustrated how the local executive remains in control of these initiatives and traditional authorities are 
only secondary at best. This can only be understood in relation to the observations put forward in Part 
1 of this paper where we described how elected politicians are key players in the local socio-political 
landscape of Lanao del Sur.  
 
PART 3: DISCUSSION 
3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
The crucial importance ascribed to hybrid institutions by TAF within their conflict management 
strategy resonates with a growing popularity of the concept of hybridity among academics, policy 
makers and development workers.91 Yet, an analysis of the TAF interpretation of hybridity in relation 
to this broader literature - which will be referred to as the HPO literature - is missing so far. This 
section of our paper will confront the rationale(s) behind the ToC and the empirical findings we 
discussed, with this broader literature. We will refer here in particular to two, widely cited, bodies of 
work. The first consists of a team of researchers who have published work around the emergence of 
hybrid institutions in a group of Pacific countries.92 The second body of work is a range of articles and 
books, published by the influential scholar Oliver Richmond.93 These two bodies of work are further 
complemented with other articles which focus on the issue of hybridity in relation to conflict 
management and peace building.94 We do not pretend to cover the whole thematic literature with this 
exercise. Rather, we wish to open up the debate and offer some fresh perspectives on the issues 
discussed above through the eyes of some influential authors.  
We turn first to the work by Boege et al. on a range of Pacific countries (Timor-Leste, Bougainville, 
Melanesia and Polynesia). Their argument starts from a stringent critique of the so-called 
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fragile/failed states literature, and more particularly the notion that this fragility would be a structural 
hindrance to any form of sustainable peace and development. In this regard, they take a clear position 
in a much older debate which goes back to the nature of violent conflict since the end of the Cold 
War. As different authors have convincingly argued, the end of the Cold War resulted in the drying up 
of a system of international patronage, either from the USSR or the US, and therefore resulted in a 
dramatic decrease of the overall capacity of different developing countries to provide basic public 
services for their citizens.95 A range of authors considered this dynamic wherein formal state capacity 
weakened or even became almost inexistent as problematic and potentially dangerous, not only for the 
people directly affected but also more generally for global stability.96 In other words, these authors 
perceived state failure/collapse/fragility as negative by definition, or a sort of ‘pathological’ 
breakdown of society.97  
In contrast to this ‘state fragility as breakdown’ discourse, Boege et al. propose a much more positive 
perspective. They acknowledge that in many places in the world - including some of the Pacific 
countries they have been studying - the state is indeed not the sole regulating framework. For 
instance, they explicitly talk about ‘outposts of the state in a societal environment that is to a large 
extent ‘stateless’.98 It is in these outposts that formal state structures are being mediated through kin-
based institutions, hereby shaping specific hybrid institutions. However, these hybrid institutions or 
other informal forms of public authority are not necessarily approached as something problematic per 
se which need to be replaced by imported ‘western-style’ institutions. Instead, these authors take a 
much more pragmatic stance in which they attempt to work with the institutions available. The main 
advantage of these hybrid institutions is that they have historically and organically grown and 
therefore have a strong social embeddedness, thereby generating a sense of continuity, trust and 
order.99  
Based on this assessment, Boege et al. formulate some ideas on the type of peace and state building 
interventions that need to be conducted. According to the authors, the interpretation of state fragility 
as a breakdown, or an anomaly, gave rise to a specific type of state intervention which is obsessed 
with re-building the ideal-type of ‘Western’ state, characterised by an impersonal bureaucracy, private 
property rights and open markets.100 Boege et al. refer to this as the ‘western OECD model’ of state 
building which is solely focused on rebuilding a ‘western-style Weberian/Westphalian state’.101 In 
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their view, these types of interventions are inevitably bound to fail as international organisations 
artificially try to impose a certain statist order which does not match local cultural practices and 
heavily distorts historically grown social structures. An important case-study illustrating this point is 
found in East Timor. In this country - which gained its independence in 2002 after years of brutal 
Indonesian occupation - the UN pursued what they consider as a ‘misguided state building from 
scratch’.102 This state-building effort was solely focused on political elites in the capital and did not 
take into account historically grown forms of indigenous governance in the countryside. As a result, a 
state has been introduced which a large part of the population considers as alien and imposed. In a 
chapter solely devoted to this case of Timor-Leste, Anne Brown (one of the co-authors of the team) 
and Alex Gusmao give a more detailed account of a wide range of customary democratic practices in 
Timor Leste which they explicitly entitle ‘hybrid orders’. 103  In their view, different UN 
administrations have grossly overlooked these manifestations of hybrid local democracy and hereby 
missed an exceptional opportunity to install a state structure which would have been more stable and 
supportive of sustainable peace.104    
Based on these assessments, a bottom-up approach of state-building is promoted in which the role of 
international organisations is confined to ‘prudent policies’ wherein support is provided for native 
hybrid institutional frameworks that manage to provide security. As such, the type of interventions 
being put forward are moderate interventions which depart from everyday realities, instead of ideal 
types of what the perfect state should look like. The (presumably failed) example of East Timor is 
then contrasted with the cases of Bougainville and Somaliland, where a state with a high level of 
security has been built after a period of warfare through an organic bottom-up process, and where the 
role of external organisations was confined to that of facilitator. With this argument, Boege et al. build 
further on a stream of literature that developed from the 1990s onwards and which critiques the 
centralised and top-down character of different peacebuilding interventions. As an alternative, this 
literature tries to emphasise the pivotal role of the ‘local’, in the sense that peacebuilding interventions 
need to be adapted to a diversity of political, social and cultural contexts. Even more so, the local is 
perceived as an exceptional resource for successful and sustainable peacebuilding and conflict 
management strategies. For instance, an influential author such as Lederach explicitly sees tradition 
and traditional leaders as exceptional resources for initiatives of peacebuilding and reconciliation as 
they have a strong social legitimacy.105 In this sense, it is only a small step away from the argument 
which states that that ‘the  only  way  to  make  state  institutions  work  is  through  utilising  kin-
based and  other  traditional  networks’.106   
Similar arguments can be encountered in the work of the British academic Oliver Richmond. 
Richmond starts his analysis from what he considers as the failures of the liberal peace model. In 
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short, the liberal peace that emerged after the end of the Cold War and was crafted in the headquarters 
(New York, London, Washington DC, Brussels) of international organisations, consists of a universal 
package of free market policies and the installment, or recrafting, of formal core state institutions 
(judiciary, police etc.). These interventions are then concluded by the organisation of free and 
democratic elections which are supposed to pave the way for the installment of a legitimate state 
apparatus and durable peace. There are several critiques of this model that have been formulated by 
Richmond and that are shared by the large majority of authors situated within the HPO literature.107 
There is the issue that these programmes are prone to capture by predatory elites, and in too many 
cases these have simply failed to deliver their promises of sustainable peace and development (among 
the examples mentioned, reference is made to Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste). 
However, the core problem is that these policies are being implemented without any careful 
deliberation with local populations and their specific expectations, interpretations and understandings 
of what comprises a truly sustainable peace. This is due to the hegemonic, ideological nature of this 
project which considers the imposition of liberal, rights-based democracy and free markets as the only 
possible avenues to reach peace and install a legitimate state. Within this vision, the local is 
considered as being ‘deviant’ and therefore a mere hindrance to the success of the project. For 
instance, Richmond considers that it is typical of the arrogance of the proponents of liberal peace that 
the recurrent failures of their interventions are not explained through some of the flawed 
underpinnings of their paradigm. Rather, failures are solely ascribed to the ‘recalcitrant’ behavior of 
the local which seems not to understand the many benefits of rights-based democracy.108 While ideas 
about civil society and participation do circulate in this paradigm, these are only taken into account 
when they fit the prescribed liberal norms and values. As a result, local populations have mainly been 
approached as voiceless subjects, instead of mature citizens.  
However, within this critique, an even deeper underlying issue can be detected. As Richmond literally 
states: ‘… contemporary neo/liberalism is plausible mainly in Western developed contexts, and 
applied elsewhere (as in the West) may be socially atomizing, hegemonic and lead to the valorization 
of predatory elites who gain easy access to an international economic and political cartography’.109 
In other words, many of the liberal assumptions underpinning these interventions are considered to be 
incompatible with local cultural standards and social structures in most of the non-Western world.  
This critique by Richmond contains important similarities with the work of Boege et al. Although 
Boege et al. do not focus their critique explicitly on the ‘liberal’ underpinnings, they also reject peace 
and state building interventions which have a universal blueprint character and therefore fail to take 
into account historically grown social formations and institutions. In addition, both accounts have a 
clear culturalist rationale to them, as they consider the bulk of contemporary interventions to be 
hegemonic and founded on Western norms and values. While Richmond explicitly speaks of Western, 
liberal standards, Boege et al. refer to these interventions as based on a ‘Western OECD model’. Most 
importantly however, due to this hegemonic and blueprint character, many of these interventions 
overrule local, indigenous governance structures and therefore fail to create a truly durable and 
legitimate state framework which is considered necessary to reach sustainable peace.  
As an alternative, both ask for more attention to local agency. Although never explicitly mentioned as 
such, Boege et al. see this local agency above all as being indigenous structures of governance which, 
ideally, become part of a more consultative and integrative approach towards peace and state building. 
For Richmond, this local agency is conceptualised somewhat more philosophically as a sort of 
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resistance and opposition which can play out in a wide diversity of organisations and institutions. The 
local is hereby understood as: ‘a dangerous and wild place where Western rationality, with its diktats 
of universality and modernisation, is challenged in different ways.’110 It is through this resistance that 
an interaction emerges between the hegemonic liberal peace paradigm and local, subaltern meanings 
and understandings of peace and it is through this interaction that Richmond defines the concept of 
hybridity. In the words of Richmond, this hybridity emerges thus: ‘The top down will trickle down to 
the bottom, and the bottom-up will then engage in a democratic process, which will bring to life a 
social contract in classic liberal fashion’.111 In this manner, the local and the international mutually 
influence each other, based on an equal status. It is also within the emergence of these types of 
hybridities that Richmond makes an argument for a post-liberal peace wherein local agency is 
seriously taken into account.112 In this regard, Richmond also speaks about a ‘pedagogy of peace’ 
wherein a dialogic relation is being established between the most and the least marginalised.113 
Throughout this dialogic relation, peacebuilding can never become a universal and homogeneous 
exercise but is instead marked by diversity and variation. Clearly, this interpretation of hybridity is 
different from the interpretation given by Boege et al. As explained, Boege et al. perceive this 
hybridity within a long-term historical process of state formation which happens through the 
interaction between indigenous structures and (post-)colonial state interventions. It is these hybrid 
institutions that need to be actively deployed within any sort of conflict management or peacebuilding 
strategy due to their strong local legitimacy. This argument is inevitably linked with the observation 
that state capacity in most parts of the world is limited. Therefore, rather than attempting to install 
ideal-type formal governance institutions, it may be more useful to work through these hybrid 
institutions. In contrast, Richmond does not provide a true account of state formation/capacity and this 
is a debate that is remarkably absent in his work on hybridity.    
3.2 THE TOC IN RELATION TO THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
Although never explicitly stated as such, it is clear that some of the general rationales behind the ToC 
on ‘Community-level efforts to improve local security in Mindanao’ share similarities with different  
features of this HPO literature. This is above all the case for the space that is provided to local usages, 
institutions and actors in settling conflict and initiating peace. In that sense, the stance taken by TAF 
is one that gives a great deal of ownership and responsibility to local organisations and does not 
follow the ‘hegemonic’ and ‘blueprint’ characteristics of classic liberal peacebuilding and state 
building that is criticised by the HPO literature. Rather, this ToC should foremost be understood as a 
pragmatic ‘hands-on’ approach which supports the capacity of local actors, organisations and 
institutions to settle conflict and reach peace. This is founded on legitimate reservations about the 
capacity of formal government institutions to reach peace in the region, as these procedures are time-
consuming and not always adapted to local complexities. Indirectly, this approach is therefore critical 
of interventions that focus only on the creation, or engineering, of formal state institutions in bringing 
peace to Mindanao.114 As explained by Luckham and Kirk, the emergence of the HPO literature 
should above all be understood as a challenge to classic state-centric security and development 
                                                          
110
 Richmond, Oliver P. and Mac Ginty, Roger (2013), op.cit., p. 763.  
111
 Richmond, Oliver P. (2009) op.cit, p. 329. 
112
 Richmond, Oliver P. (2009) op.cit, p. 331. 
113
 Richmond, Oliver P. (2012a) op.cit, p. 123. 
114
 Mid-term workshop with members CMU, Manila, 02.03.2013.  
31 
 
analysis,115 and here too the ToC shares similarities with some of the most important rationales behind 
the literature. However, in the case of TAF, this renouncement of classic state-led development 
paradigms did not follow a cultural reasoning. There is no mention of the imposition of alien 
‘western’ models of state and peace building (as is the case with Boege et al.), neither is there a 
systematic elaboration of the hegemonic liberal underpinnings of these interventions (as is the case 
with Richmond).  
However, things become more complicated when studying the way in which hybridity is  
conceptualised and how this conceptualisation is reflected in daily programming within TAF. As we 
have already stated in the introduction, there is only a general elaboration on the issue of hybridity as 
being an interaction between formal and informal institutions.  In daily parlance, evaluation and 
programming, this idea had limited resonance. Rather, when hybridity was referred to, the term was 
used to stress the importance of everything informal and non-state. It may be reassuring to note that 
within the HPO literature, there is no fixed definition of this concept of hybridity. In yet another 
article, every post-conflict society that does not follow the logics of a textbook liberal democratic 
state is placed under the label of ‘hybrid peace’.116 For instance, as explained above, the way that 
Boege et al. and Richmond approach this is significantly different. The way hybridity is understood 
within TAF does not follow the arguments put forward by Richmond but rather shares similarities 
with the work of Boege et al. The TAF ToC departs from an assessment which considers the overall 
socio-political environment in western Mindanao as a weak state, wherein informal institutions have a 
limited reach. Due to this weak state capacity, these formal institutions have interacted with resilient, 
indigenous institutional frameworks. As such, although this term was not actively applied among TAF 
personnel, the overall depiction of Mindanao comes very close to what is described as a ‘hybrid 
political order’ by Boege et al. In this hybrid political order, the state does not have a privileged 
position as the political framework that provides security, welfare and representation, since it has to 
share authority with  other  structures. 
However, apart from pointing out some of these similarities, the most interesting exercise might be to 
make a critical reading of the ToC in light of the literature discussed above and some of the critiques 
that have been formulated on the HPO literature. For reasons of clarity, we will divide our analysis 
into three interrelated parts.  
1. A first important critique of the HPO literature is the general and vague conceptualisations of the 
concept of hybridity. Agreement exists on the fact that this hybridity emerges through an 
interaction between everything global/international and everything indigenous/local. Clearly, this 
carries a wide meaning and the danger exists that this becomes a shallow and meaningless concept 
that can be detected everywhere. This feeling was also confirmed in different interviews as people 
(both people directly and indirectly linked to TAF) sometimes voiced their frustration that this 
hybridity ‘is very big’ and is therefore difficult to operationalise in specific interventions.117 This 
is also a critique that can be levelled against the work of Boege et al., since it often seems that 
hybridity comes to stand for everything that falls outside formal state institutions and the 
conceptual difference between hybridity and traditional/indigenous is not always obvious. In other 
words, there is a fundamental question of why there is such a strong focus on these historical 
interactions when it seems that the authors essentially wish to point to the advantages of locally 
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embedded indigenous institutions. However, within the framework of this Theory in Practice 
paper, the discussion is not merely conceptual/academic but also has some operational 
consequences. This is also an observation made by Luckham and Kirk, where - after a systematic 
review of the HPO literature – they state that: ‘one may argue that the concept of hybridity works 
best as a critique  of  existing  state-building  and  governance  approaches,  rather  than  offering  
a  credible  and well defined alternative to the latter’.118 The issue that clearly emerges is what 
exactly is it that gives this issue of hybridity an added value? Why exactly hybridity and not 
ownership? Why exactly hybridity rather than social embeddedness or legitimacy? Why exactly 
hybridity and not agency? From our analysis in Lanao del Sur and North Cotabato,119 the two 
most important advantages ascribed to this specific strategy of conflict management are: (a) a 
pragmatic - yet highly defendable - cost-efficiency argument stating that even if the institutional 
environment in which one is operating is not perfect, one should work with whatever actors, 
organisations or institutions are present in order to solve disputes quickly, rather than attempting 
to install an ideal institutional environment;  and (b) by working with these local institutions, 
actors and organisations the interventions obtain a certain embeddedness and a sense of 
ownership exists that would be impossible to reach if one worked only through formal 
government institutions. This is already evident through the specific symbols and rituals (e.g. 
blood money, kanduli, religious symbols) that are being deployed. Moreover, the conflicting 
parties have a great say over the actual sequence of events, the content of the reconciliation 
process, and how this should be achieved. This sense of ownership, which is closely linked to a 
great deal of flexibility, is persistently mentioned as a substantial added value. The issue of 
hybridity can be considered as secondary when compared to these two points.   
 
2. A possible way out of this conceptual vagueness may be to disaggregate between different levels 
of hybridity. A recent article by Millar in the Journal of Peace Research suggested making a 
distinction between an institutional, practical, ritual and conceptual level of hybridity.120  The 
author suggests making this distinction since, in his view, not every scale of hybridity is amenable 
to the type of purposeful planning that international organisations want to pursue. Institutional 
hybridity is hereby approached as the deliberate creation of new institutions by international 
organisations. The example given is that of the Special Court for Sierra Leone being a truly 
hybrid criminal court. Hybridity at the practical level is something that is (dis)incentivised by 
international actors. In other words, there is no deliberate engineering of new hybrid institutions 
but certain existing practices (e.g. the payment of blood money) are actively supported. Ritual 
hybridity is defined in Millar’s article as ‘the mixing of symbol and ceremony to form new ritual 
forms or the appropriation or deployment of existing ritual for new purposes.’ This differs from 
practical hybridity since practical hybridity primarily concerns ‘everyday actions resulting from 
the choices agents make’. Finally, conceptual hybridity concerns ‘the mixing and melding of 
ideas and beliefs about the world in the minds of individuals’ and is a type of hybridity over 
which international organisations do not have control.  Clearly, the differing scales that are being 
used here depend on the level of social engineering, planning and predictability that goes with it. 
Following this hierarchy, it is clear that the TAF conflict management interventions come close to 
what is considered as practical hybridity, since a deliberate choice is made to support certain 
practices.  This implies that these interventions cannot be put under the label of ‘institutional 
hybridity’ as there is no purposeful creation of new and truly sustainable institutions, although the 
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ToC itself speaks about hybridity at the level of actual institutions. Next, as is clear from our 
empirical data, the type of hybridity that is being reached is more of a situational, ad-hoc type 
rather than having a truly institutionalised nature. What one most often witnessed was that a 
formal institutional forum acted as a venue for a diversity of practices that could be put under the 
heading of ‘informal reconciliation’. Furthermore, this practical hybridity is primarily actor-
oriented as this concerns the ‘everyday choices’ of local individuals about ‘how to perform 
peacebuilding functions’.121 Indirectly, this was also admitted by TAF staff when they stated that 
their conflict management strategy is first and foremost dependent on the involvement of credible 
mediators (local champions).122 In other words, the approach deployed by TAF is more of an 
actor-oriented approach than a truly institutional approach. In that sense, the basic rationale 
underlying these conflict management interventions comes remarkably close to what is being 
called a ‘coalitional ToC’ in other TAF programmes.123 Although the objectives within these 
Coalitions for Change programmes are different from the settlement of violent disputes, the 
specific strategy for reaching these objectives through ‘relationships with various coalitions and 
networks’ hereby ‘establishing an environment of constructive engagement between civil 
society/reform actors and government’ is remarkably similar. To a certain extent, it might even be 
argued that this coalitional ToC comes closer to the specific strategies TAF is deploying in their 
conflict management interventions when compared to the hybrid institutional ToC.  
 
3. In their review of the HPO literature, Luckham and Kirk notice a remarkable absence of questions 
about power. As they argue: ‘Whilst new approaches to human and citizen security have 
challenged the state-centric bias of previous security thinking, they still tend to overlook 
security’s relationships to political power, including its deeply contested nature in hybrid political 
orders’.124 As we have elaborated above, the provision of security is a pivotal asset in the build-up 
of political authority. This implies that an analysis of conflict management interventions always 
needs to be contextual by taking into account broader power structures and how the interventions 
relate to these broader power structures. We would stress that TAF is aware of the politicised 
nature of their conflict management interventions, in the sense that there is a strong awareness  
that for a successful settlement of disputes a certain political capital is inevitable. It is also 
admitted that this political capital is found particularly among local elites. However, in their 
paper, Luckham and Kirk do not necessarily wish to tackle the rather pragmatic question of how 
certain elite constellations can be successfully deployed for the settlement of disputes. Rather, 
they particularly wish to push a broader research agenda where these elite coalitions and their 
specific interventions would be studied within a broader socio-political field. This includes some 
straightforward empirical questions such as: who is included/excluded in these arrangements; how 
far do these arrangements challenge or reinforce exclusivist political orders; and who exactly are 
the people providing security. It has not been possible to deal systematically with all of these 
questions within this paper. However, two important remarks need to be made. Firstly, as we have 
extensively elaborated in Sections 1 and 2, the extent to which the political capital necessary for 
successful conflict management is situated in a traditional/informal field might be overrated. 
Rather, this political capital is primarily situated in elected office, considering the control over 
coercive means and patronage by the local executive. This observation inevitably leads to a 
second point. This is the question of how these interventions, and the specific elite coalitions 
behind them, should be analysed within a socio-political field which is marked by its highly 
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authoritarian and coercive features, despite the formal existence of an electoral democracy. For 
instance, the German Africanist Andreas Mehler explicitly states that the hybrid solutions 
suggested by Boege et al. ‘are in danger of bringing on more of the same – neo-patrimonial 
instability and inefficiency’.125 In other words, what Mehler puts forward is that a choice of the 
traditional, the local, or the hybrid for that matter, cannot be separated from questions about the 
highly illiberal characteristics of some of these institutions. This is also admitted by Richmond 
himself when he states that: ‘… local actors and contexts can be partisan, discriminatory, 
exclusive and violent (as can international actors). Local contexts also contain power relations and 
hierarchies that favour some above others (as do international frameworks).’126 These questions 
are reminiscent of a related debate about the support provided to indigenous institutions of 
resource management by a whole range of international organisations. Despite a range of ‘positive 
characteristics’ in such indigenous institutions, different authors have also pointed to their highly 
exclusivist features and their vulnerability to elite capture.127 Against the background of the elite-
based and violent socio-political context wherein TAF is intervening in Mindanao, this puts 
forward some inevitable political and even ideological questions that will remain at the core of 
any intervention in the region. Is there a line to be drawn in working with elite coalitions with 
some highly illiberal and authoritarian credentials? How far are practices of patronage enforced 
by indirectly supporting the practice of blood money? These questions do not necessarily need a 
straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer and will always depend on careful judgment and attention to 
the specific context. What is more fundamental, however, is that these questions point to a deeper 
underlying issue. This is the fact that the balance and interaction between pragmatic conflict 
management interventions focusing on the quick settlement of violent disputes on the one hand 
and governance programmes aimed at the long-term reinforcement of impersonal institutions on 
the other hand, needs a deeper and more systematic elaboration.    
3.3 CONCLUSION 
In this third section, we have related our empirical findings, and the rationales behind the ToC on 
conflict management, to the broader HPO literature. We hereby illustrated how different 
characteristics of this ToC follow the broader arguments provided by the HPO literature. This is 
particularly the case through the focus on local agency, cultural practices and indigenous institutions 
within peacebuilding and the (explicit and implicit) refusal to promote classic state-led governance 
programmes attempting to install efficient and impersonal institutions.  
On the other hand, it is also clear that some critical remarks about the ToC can be put forward, based 
on some of the pertinent critiques formulated in the HPO literature. In particular, we have focused on 
three interrelated issues: 
1) The ToC would benefit from a more systematic reflection about where the added value of the 
hybridity concept lies in daily programming. It seems that hybridity and tradition/informality are often 
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used interchangeably and the specific added values that are being ascribed to this hybridity can often 
be detected in the broader field of tradition/informality. This puts forward the question: why hybridity 
and not ownership, flexibility, or embededdness? 
2) We have suggested thinking about the scale of hybridity that is being reached through these 
interventions. Based on the literature, we have suggested that the interaction between the formal and 
the informal should be conceptualised as a practical hybridity, due to its ad-hoc nature, actor-oriented 
perspective and the fact that the type of programming is above all about the (dis)incentivising of 
certain existing practices, rather than the creation of new institutions. Based on this observation it was 
then suggested to elaborate more systematically how this ToC on hybrid conflict managements relates 
to other ‘coalitional’ ToC’s that have been used for other types of programming and interventions by 
TAF. 
3) We have suggested accounting more directly for the place of politics and power within these 
interventions. Based on our empirical assessment in Lanao del Sur, it is clear that the environment in 
which TAF is intervening is characterised by some highly authoritarian and coercive characteristics. 
In this socio-political environment, the local executive is the key player, rather than traditional or 
other informal authorities. Inevitably, when conducting conflict management interventions in this 
region, one needs a certain degree of pragmatism. Partly, this pragmatism towards ‘the local’ is the 
ultimate feature of the hybrid approach TAF is proposing here. However, the ToC itself would greatly 
benefit from a more systematic elaboration about the relationship between these conflict management 
and governance programmes aimed at the long-term reinforcement of impersonal institutions.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This paper offers an analysis of a particular set of conflict management interventions by The Asia 
Foundation in the province of Lanao del Sur, Mindanao. These interventions were funded by DFID 
through a PPA, for which a specific ToC was written down. With this paper, we did not have the 
intention of providing a systematic assessment of the efficacy or sustainability of these interventions. 
Rather, we have elaborated on some of the major conceptual underpinnings of this ToC in relation to 
the usage of the concept of hybridity. This has been done through an analysis of relevant policy 
documents and a fieldwork visit to the province of Lanao del Sur in autumn 2013.  
Overall, it has been demonstrated how a framing of Lanao del Sur, and Muslim Mindanao more 
generally, as consisting of weak state institutions and strong informal institutions, is the guiding 
rationale behind the formulation of this ToC. Our fieldwork data indicate that this should be nuanced. 
As has been consistently demonstrated throughout this paper, the state remains a key player in the 
field of conflict management. First of all, this is evident in the pivotal role played by politicians in 
settling disputes through their control over different types of coercive organisations and their access to 
financial resources. These two assets are crucial, not only for the successful conclusion of disputes, 
but in the establishment of political authority in the community in general. It is against the backdrop 
of this observation that the place of traditional authority needs to be understood. Tradition as such 
largely remains an empty box when it comes to conflict management. It is only when traditional 
leaders manage to combine the symbolic capital associated with traditional leadership with the 
financial and coercive resources associated with modern statehood that they manage to play an 
important role in conflict management. The omnipotence of the state in this particular field of 
governance can also be discerned by an analysis of the specific institutional mechanisms through 
which conflicts are settled. As illustrated, the hybrid nature of conflict management institutions needs 
to be understood as one wherein formal state institutions come to serve as avenues for informal 
practices of mediation and amicable settlement. The clearest example of this hybrid interaction can be 
detected in the fact that the tradition of paying blood money to compensate for harm inflicted has 
become the prime way of settling disputes in formal institutions such as the municipal Peace and 
Order Councils/Committee. Importantly, this Council/Committee is dominated by the local executive, 
thereby further confirming his control over the manner in which disputes are settled in the 
community.  
Thus, the claim that TAF is working with a specific set of hybrid conflict management institutions can 
be confirmed. However, through a critical engagement with some of the academic Hybrid Political 
Order literature, it has also been put forward that the added value of this hybrid approach could be 
sharpened. Very much in line with major publications within this literature, an obvious and 
convincing argument is being made as to why working through informal practices of dispute 
settlement has some clear advantages. As our fieldwork data also indicate, these practices have a 
strong local embeddedness, and are considered as being accessible and flexible when compared to 
formal punitive justice. However, the shift from this observation towards an explicit and strong 
argument for working with hybrid institutions is generally lacking. In order to establish this argument, 
which could serve as the overall conceptual underpinning of this specific ToC, two broad issues need 
to be tackled. First, there is a need for a much stronger elaboration on the role that should be played 
by the state both in the immediate and long-term future in Muslim Mindanao. Obviously, the answers 
to this question will depend very much on the outcomes of the current negotiations between the MILF 
and the Philippine government. Secondly, this also 
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management interventions relate to other more classic governance programmes aimed at the 
establishment of efficient and impersonal governance institutions.  
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